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ABSTRACT 
 The objective for this thesis project is to attempt to identify why 688 class 
submarine Docking Selected Restricted Availabilities (DSRAs) at Pearl Harbor Naval 
Shipyard (PHNSY) are growing in man-days every year. The intent is to find an objective 
and realistic means for process improvement for submarine maintenance. This research 
relies on publicly available financial data gathered from the Navy's Office of Budget 
(FMB) as well as the Navy’s Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC) management and information database. The research is exploratory and 
seeks to identify similar trends in both availability man-days and financial costs. The 
research attempts to identify areas that could be driving maintenance growth as well as 
calls for an increase in data fidelity for future availabilities. 
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This thesis serves as a trend analysis of costs and man-days at both Pearl Harbor 
(PHNSY) and Portsmouth (PNSY) Naval Shipyards. This is not to serve as a statistical 
analysis or a report that shows a causation due to the correlations found through the 
analysis, but rather serves as a reason for the adoption of a simple means to track data at 
public shipyards. PHNSY and PNSY were selected due to their nearly exclusive work on 
fast attack submarines, as well as the large informational data set available for specific 
maintenance periods at the yards. PHNSY was found to have a large number of the DSRAs 
performed on 688 class submarines while PNSY performed a large number of EOHs on 
688 class submarines from 2007–2019. 
This trend analysis has discovered a correlation between apprenticeship costs at the 
shipyards and the growth in maintenance man-days. Specifically, a trend was identified 
that started in 2014, with yearly man-day growth for DSRAs at PHNSY rising at a suddenly 
faster rate than previous periods. This shift in man-day growth correlated to the divergence 
of apprenticeship costs per apprentice at PHNSY when compared to PNSY. 
Based on these corresponding events, an extrapolation shows that with conservative 
estimates, if apprenticeship program costs are being absorbed by DSRA project funds, 
approximately 30% of the annual growth in DSRA man-days can be attributed to the 
apprenticeship program. This extrapolation is meant to serve as an illustration of why an 
objective means of accounting for hours worked on a specific job in a maintenance 
availability is necessary. 
xvi 
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This thesis is meant to serve as a comparison and an analysis of public and private 
shipyard financial practices in regard to submarine maintenance availabilities. Specifically, 
this thesis will attempt to address the rise in both cost and man-hours of selected submarine 
maintenance availabilities for Los Angeles class submarines, as well as compare and 
contrast costs associated with submarine maintenance at public shipyards.  
1. Problem Statement 
Examine how cost growth of major submarine maintenance periods has manifested 
across public shipyards. 
2. Research Questions 
1. Are cost growths of DSRA maintenance at PHNSY inconsistent with other 
public shipyards? 
2. Is there a fair price comparison of DSRA maintenance performed at 
private and public shipyards? 
3. Are there common financial trends between the 4 public shipyards? 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to provide an accurate comparison of costs between 
public shipyards in regard to Los Angeles class submarine maintenance in selected 
availabilities. This thesis will also attempt to provide analysis of quantifiable factors that 
could indicate opportunities to improve in resource management for the public shipyards.  
C. SCOPE 
Previous research, analysis, and thesis projects has limited the scope of comparison 
in varying degrees. This thesis will focus analysis in the following ways. 
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1. Selected Availabilities: The selected availabilities analyzed for Los 
Angeles Class submarines will be limited to DSRAs, EOHs, and PIRA 
periods. The three maintenance availability types selected is larger than 
previous analysis but is necessary for this analysis such that trends can be 
identified across shipyards. 
2. Shipyards: All four public shipyards that perform maintenance on Los 
Angeles Class submarines. These shipyards will be analyzed for their 
appropriateness to be included in trend analysis. Determinations will be 
made whether particular shipyards should be included in specific analysis 
and may be included in some analysis but may be not be included in other 
analysis. 
3. Time: Maintenance availabilities and financial data will be analyzed 
primarily between the years 2007 and 2018. In some comparisons the time 
limitations will be lifted to show historical context and trends prior to 
shifting fiscal practices.  
4. Monetary and Personnel Data: All monetary and personnel data analyzed 
is provided through open source documents available through FMB Navy 





The purpose of this chapter is to provide sufficient information on previous research 
and theses to provide context for this thesis analysis.  
B. SHIPYARD LOCATIONS 
There are four public shipyards and two private shipyards that perform maintenance 
availabilities on Los Angeles class submarines. The four public shipyards are Pearl Harbor 
Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,  
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Bremerton, 
Washington, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, and Norfolk Naval Shipyard 
in Portsmouth, Virginia. The two private shipyards are General Dynamic’s Electric Boat 
in Groton, Connecticut, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding  
in Newport News, Virginia. These locations are where the majority of maintenance is 
performed; however, some work is performed by some of the shipyards at others of  
the above shipyards, or at submarine bases, due to dry-dock availability or other  
contract requirements.  
C. MAINTENANCE AVAILABILITIES 
Los Angeles class submarines undergo three typical availability types throughout 
their time commissioned. The three main types of availabilities are DSRAs, EOHs, and a 
PIRA. Typically, each submarine will have a DSRA every 72 months, and this availability 
will last a nominal 3 months (COMNAVSEASYSCOM, 2010). Recent trends in DSRA 
maintenance availabilities have shown that the average time for completion of a DSRA for 
a Los Angeles class submarine has increased to over 5 months (CBO, 2019). 
EOHs typically occur for Los Angeles class submarines every 10 years and will 
nominally take 2 years for completion. Major ship upgrades occur during this maintenance 
availability and are necessary to maintain a modern and highly capable submarine fleet.  
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PIRAs are hull specific availabilities that are designed to obtain one last 
deployment out of an aging submarine prior to inactivation of said submarine. PIRAs are 
typically longer than DSRAs but faster than EOHs (Chief of Naval Operations, 2013). 
While DSRAs, EOHs, and PIRAs are not the only maintenance periods that a 
submarine will undergo, they are the typical CNO availabilities that all submarines will 
nominally experience. Additionally, although there is a large disparity between scope and 
time required during the different maintenance periods, all three availabilities experience 
similar pressures to execute on time and trends identified in one availability type can be 
indicative of trends in other availability types due to the similarity between shipyards and 
infrastructure/support required for submarine maintenance. 
D. COSTS OF SUBMARINE MAINTENANCE 
The April 2019 Congressional Budget Office report entitled Costs of Submarine 
Maintenance at Public and Private Shipyards provided analysis of historical costs of 
DSRA maintenance periods for Los Angeles class submarines between 1993–2017. This 
analysis was carefully segmented into three time periods that correlated with changes in 
financial accounting practices as well as a transition period. The report states that in 1999 
the Navy began transitioning from a working capital funding (WCF) method at public 
shipyards to a mission funding method. The transition was completed in 2007, and mission 
funding was used at all public shipyards. Findings from this report are included in Table 1. 
The CBO report summarized that the average cost is higher for DSRA maintenance on Los 
Angeles class submarines at public shipyards, however public shipyards average about 1 
month faster than private shipyards to complete a DSRA. The CBO does identify several 
limitations to their analysis; specifically, that the VAMOSC data for cost of shipyards does 
not match cost of data from other Navy sources. The CBO report corrected costs in 
VAMOSC data to best available, but some inconsistencies could remain. Additionally, at 
the time of analysis, only one DSRA had occurred at a private shipyard since 2010. The 
report also identifies that additional submarines could be sent to private shipyards for cost 
saving measures, but only briefly addresses the time and space constraints held by private 
5 
shipyards due to the construction of new Virginia class submarines and the soon to be 
constructed Columbia class submarines. 
Table 1. DSRA Overhauls of SSN-688s, by Period of Funding.  




E. MAINTENANCE SCHEDULES AND SKILLED LABOR PERSONNEL 
GAO’s December 2019 report, Persistent and Substantial Ship and Maintenance 
Delays Hinder Efforts to Rebuild Readiness, identifies several issues that could be major 
contributors to delays and cost overruns at naval shipyards. These issues include the 
difficulty in adhering to maintenance schedules due to operational tempo and scheduling 
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difficulties, as well as the shortages of skilled personnel in critical fields such as welding 
and ship fitters.  
The difficulty in adhering to maintenance schedules is evident in multiple 
spectrums. The first is explored in-part by Lindle and Wisz’s 2019 thesis that describes the 
process where a large portion of work to be completed in a DSRA is added after “final” 
approval by the Navy. This is because new work is identified as the ship approaches a 
maintenance availability. While the new work itself is not individually an issue for the 
shipyards, it does present opportunities for scheduling problems to arise due to limited 
resources and space at the shipyards. These late additions of work add both time and cost 
to the scheduled availability prior to the ship even entering the shipyard. The second 
spectrum of maintenance overruns is also explored by Lindle and Wisz (2019). Their 
findings indicate the growth in Man-Hours to complete similar maintenance jobs. For 
example, their findings indicate that the same job in 2007 took fewer Man-Hours to 
complete than it does in 2017. The longer hours working on the same or similar jobs was 
shown by Lindle and Wisz to not be directly linked to hull age, but rather fiscal year. The 
more recent the maintenance was performed, the longer that maintenance likely took. 
The shortage of skilled welders and ship fitters identified by the GAO report in 
December 2019 is not the first indication of the labor shortage. The GAO report shows that 
shipyards have increased their hiring rate since 2014, and has resulted in a 22% increase in 
workers between 2014 and 2019. Shipyards have also increased incentive programs to 
attract and maintain skilled laborers. The training of a new apprentice takes approximately 
5 years, with 4 years as an apprentice before becoming fully productive, however this 
timeline the Navy hopes to shorten with new training techniques. On the job training is 
emphasized as a means of shortening the time to train a new worker because of the valuable 
training experience available outside of a classroom. 
The standard process to become a qualified skilled labor at the public shipyards 
require completion of 4 years as an apprentice. Throughout the apprenticeship, each 
apprentice spends hours in the classroom and shop as well as receives on-the-job training 
working on submarine projects under a qualified laborer. 
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F. SUBMARINE MAINTENANCE JOB PLANNING PRACTICES 
The whitepaper produced by Matthew Carreras, Trust, outlines the planning 
process that maintenance periods require prior to the submarine arrives in port (2019). 
Carreras describes the process on how a submarine maintenance availability is planned. In 
summary, first the Navy identifies which maintenance jobs will be required during the 
availability. Once the list of jobs is provided, the shipyard engineers create a time estimate 
for each job based on previous history of completing the same, or similar jobs. Once this 
timeline is presented by the engineers, the shipyard management, supervisors, and 
engineers determine the optimal scheduling for the jobs and provide both a time and budget 
estimate to the Navy. Several iterations of this process occur prior to the submarine entering 
the availability. 
Carreras goes further and postulates that occasional maintenance jobs are 
artificially inflated due to either apprentice on-the-job training included in the maintenance 
job or the downtime between workable jobs are inappropriately charged to maintenance 
jobs that are not ready to be worked. Carreras does state that the exact hours of a job are 
not able to be accurately tracked because of the nature in which jobs are performed. Union 
pressure is the driving force for not keeping accurate time measurements for job 
completion. Without the accurate accounting of how long and which qualified worker 
works on a job, future jobs can only be planned for with approximations. Additionally, 
there is speculation suggested that apprentice on-the-job training is paid for through project 








The first step in this analysis is to identify a suitable means to compare shipyards. 
To begin, this analysis took a holistic approach to identify which shipyards performed the 
majority of the common availabilities. The data provided by FMB slightly conflicts with 
VAMOSC data, nevertheless, to provide for additional independent comparison, FMB data 
is compared with VAMOSC. 
A. COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF AVAILABILITIES PER SHIPYARD 
Of the data available through FMB, there were a total of 49 EOHs, DSRAs, and 
PIRAs that were performed at public shipyards between 2009 and 2019. VAMOSC 
provides slightly different data, with a total of 59 availabilities at public and private 
shipyards between 2007 and 2019. The data is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Total Availabilities at each shipyard FY2007–2009.  
Adapted from VAMOSC (2020) and FMB (2020). 
Although Figure 1 shows that the numbers from VAMOSC and FMB are not 
identical, a conclusion can easily be reached that EOHs, DSRAs, and PIRAs predominantly 
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occur at either Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard or Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Further 
breakdown of what type of availability happened at each shipyard is provided in Figures 
2, 3, and 4. 
 
Figure 2. Total DSRAs at each shipyard FY2007-2019. Adapted from 
VAMOSC (2020) and FMB (2020). 
 
Figure 3. Total EOHs at each shipyard FY2007-2019. Adapted from 
VAMOSC (2020) and FMB (2020). 
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Figure 4. Total PIRAs at each shipyard FY2007-2019. Adapted from 
VAMOSC (2020) and FMB (2020). 
Figures 1, 2 ,3, and 4 show that both VAMOSC and FMB data suggest that an 
overwhelming majority of DSRAs occurred at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, the majority 
of EOHs occurred at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and PIRAs occurred roughly equally 
between Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Portsmouth Naval Shipyards. 
B. COMPARISON OF AVAILABILITY COSTS 
Figure 5 shows how the cost of DSRAs of 688 class submarines have changed since 
2007 while Figure 6 shows the cost of EOHs since 2007. Figures 5 and 6 show the steady 
rise in the price of each availability per year. Figure 7 alternatively shows the apparent 
sporadic cost of PIRAs since 2007, and is expected to be sporadic due to the hull specific 
nature of a PIRA maintenance period. 
12 
 
Figure 5. Total cost of DSRAs started and completed between 
FY2007–2019. Source: VAMOSC (2020). 
 
Figure 6. Total Cost of EOHs started and completed between 
FY2007–2019. Source: VAMOSC (2020). 
13 
 
Figure 7. Total cost of PIRAs started and completed between 
FY2007–2019. Source: VAMOSC (2020). 
C. COMPARISON OF MAN-DAYS 
Figure 8 shows how the total man-days of DSRAs of 688 class submarines have 
changed since 2007 while Figure 9 shows the total man-days of EOHs since 2007. Figures 
8 and 9 show the steady rise in the price of each availability per year. Figure 10 alternatively 
shows the apparent sporadic total man-days of PIRAs since 2007, and is expected to be 
sporadic due to the hull specific nature of a PIRA maintenance period. 
14 
 
Figure 8. Total man-days of DSRAs started and completed between 
FY2007–2019. Source: FMB (2020). 
 
Figure 9. Total man-days of EOHs started and completed between FY2007–
2019. Source: FMB (2020). 
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Figure 10. Total man-days of DSRAs started and completed between 
FY2007–2019. Source: FMB (2020). 
Based on the inconsistency of costs and Man-Days of PIRAs between FY2007 and 
FY2016, PIRAs do not serve as a good availability type to assess cost trends across 
shipyards. This is consistent with the hull specific requirements nature of PIRA 
maintenance periods. But, because of the high number of DSRAs that occurred at PHNSY 
and high number of EOHs that occurred at PNSY from FY2006 to FY 2018, a common 
trend can be seen. Although the man-days required for DSRAs and EOHs differ in 
magnitude, a similar upward trend in man-days can be observed for these different 
availabilities at different shipyards. This similar trend is seen in total costs for the shipyards 
as well.  
D. NARROWING SCOPE TO PHNSY AND PNSY 
Because there is a disparity between the types of maintenance items at each 
shipyard, there are too few data points to perform a meaningful comparison of different 
shipyards with respect to a single availability type. However, there are a larger number of 
DSRA maintenance periods at PHNSY and a larger number of EOH maintenance periods 
at PNSY than any other type of maintenance at the other shipyards. By limiting the number 
of shipyards to just PHNSY and PNSY I can perform a deeper comparison of labor costs 
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for these shipyards over time. Figure 11 shows the trend of total direct labor man-days for 
both EOHs at PNSY and DSRAs at PHNSY while Figure 12 shows the total cost of those 
maintenance periods. 
 
Figure 11. Total Actual Direct Labor Man-Days at PHNSY and PNSY for 
DSRAs and EOHs. Source: FMB (2020). 
 
Figure 12. Total Cost of DSRAs and EOHs at PHNSY and PNSY.  
Source: VAMOSC (2020). 
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Figure 13 graphically shows the similar trend in Direct O&M Base money that the 
PHNSY and PNSY received. This shows a consistent trend in shipyard spending from 
2007–2019. 
 
Figure 13. Direct O&M Fleet Base Budget at PHNSY and PNSY 
adjusted to FY19k$. Source: FMB (2020).  
Figure 14 graphically shows the similar trend unit cost per man-day money at 
PHNSY and PNSY. Unit costs reports the total cost less direct material, direct contract, 
other direct, and MICON per direct labor man-day delivered. This shows a consistent trend 
in shipyard costs from 2007–2019. 
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Figure 14. Unit Cost at PHNSY and PNSY adjusted to FY19k$.  
Source: FMB (2020). 
Figure 15 graphically shows the similar trend in direct civilian labor costs at 
PHNSY and PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in labor costs from 2007–2019. 
 
Figure 15. Direct Civilian Labor Cost at PHNSY and PNSY adjusted 
to FY19k$. Source: FMB (2020). 
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Figure 16 graphically shows the similar trend in direct material costs at PHNSY 
and PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in costs from 2007–2019. 
 
Figure 16. Direct Material Cost at PHNSY and PNSY adjusted to 
FY19k$. Source: FMB (2020). 
Figure 17 graphically shows the similar trend in overhead civilian labor costs at 
PHNSY and PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in overhead costs for civilian labor from 
2007–2019. 
 
Figure 17. Overhead Civilian Labor Cost at PHNSY and PNSY adjusted to 
FY19k$. Source: FMB (2020). 
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Figure 18 graphically shows the similar trend in overhead non-labor costs at 
PHNSY and PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in overhead non-labor costs from 2007–
2019. 
 
Figure 18. Overhead Non-labor Cost at PHNSY and PNSY adjusted to 
FY19k$. Source: FMB (2020). 
Figure 19 graphically shows the similar trend in mission man-days at PHNSY and 
PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in workload from 2007–2019. 
 
Figure 19. Total Mission Man-Days (submarines) at PHNSY and 
PNSY adjusted to FY19k$. Source: FMB (2020). 
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Figure 20 graphically shows the similar trend in civilian end strength at PHNSY 
and PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in labor force from 2007–2019. 
 
Figure 20. Civilian End Strength at PHNSY and PNSY adjusted to 
FY19k$. Source: FMB (2020). 
As can be seen with the Figures 11 through 20 above, PHNSY and PNSY have 
consistently trended together between FY2007 and FY2019. These two shipyards are 
highly relatable because of their characteristics of nearly exclusive work on submarines, 
particularly during the maintenance availability periods bound by this thesis. Additionally, 
when the fiscal categories above are normalized by submarine man-hours worked, a similar 
comparison can be seen in Figures 21 through 26. This indicates that costs at both PHNSY 
and PNSY are consistent when normalized to Man-Days worked on submarines. However, 
although the GAO report claims that shipyards have increased their hiring rate, that rate is 
not keeping pace with the Man-Days worked at PHNSY or PNSY. In fact, the civilian 
workforce at both PHNSY and PNSY has increased 45% at PHNSY and 61% at PNSY, 
but the civilian labor per Man-Day has decreased approximately 81% at both shipyards 
between from 2007 to 2019. This indicates that either the hiring rate of civilians is not 
sufficient to maintain the demand for work, or that the Man-Hours that are recorded for 
submarine maintenance is growing faster than the hiring rate.  
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Figure 21 plots the similar normalized trend in Direct O&M Base dollars per 
submarine man-days at PHNSY and PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in funding 
requirements per man-day from 2007–2019. 
 
Figure 21. Direct O&M Fleet Base per Submarine Man-Day 
(FY19k$/Sub Man-Day). Source: FMB (2020). 
Figure 22 plots the similar normalized trend in direct civilian labor costs per 
submarine man-days at PHNSY and PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in labor costs 
per man-day from 2007–2019. 
 
Figure 22. Direct Civilian Labor Cost per Submarine Man-Day 
(FY19k$/Sub Man-Day). Source: FMB (2020). 
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Figure 23 plots the similar normalized trend in direct material costs per submarine 
man-days at PHNSY and PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in material costs per man-
day from 2007–2019. 
 
Figure 23. Direct Material Cost per Submarine Man-Day 
(FY19k$/Sub Man-Day). Source: FMB (2020). 
Figure 24 plots the similar normalized trend in overhead civilian labor costs per 
submarine man-days at PHNSY and PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in overhead 
labor costs per man-day from 2007–2019. 
 
Figure 24. Overhead Civilian Labor Cost per Submarine Man-Day 
(FY19k$/Sub Man-Day). Source: FMB (2020). 
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Figure 25 plots the similar normalized trend in overhead non-labor costs per 
submarine man-days at PHNSY and PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in overhead non-
labor costs per man-day from 2007–2019. 
 
Figure 25. Overhead Non-labor Cost per Submarine Man-Day 
(FY19k$/Sub Man-Day). Source: FMB (2020). 
Figure 26 plots the similar normalized trend in civilian end strength per submarine 
man-days at PHNSY and PNSY. This shows a consistent trend in work force per man-day 
from 2007–2019. 
 
Figure 26. Civilian End Strength per Submarine Man-Day. 
Source: FMB (2020). 
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E. COMPARISON OF APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAMS 
The following graphs show the total number of apprenticeships and apprenticeship 
costs incurred at PHNSY and PNSY from FY2007 through FY2018. This data is provided 
from FMB Budget Justifications. 
Figure 27 shows that between the years 2007–2014, PHNSY and PNSY each 
employed nearly identical total numbers of apprentices. 
 
Figure 27. Number of Apprentice Workers. Source: FMB (2020). 
Figure 28 shows that between the years 2007–2014, PHNSY and PNSY each 




Figure 28. Total Apprenticeship Cost in FY19k$. Source: FMB (2020). 
Figure 29 shows the total apprenticeship cost per apprentice at both PHNSY and 
PNSY. 
 
Figure 29. Total Apprenticeship Cost per Apprentice 
(FY19k$/Apprentice). Source: FMB (2020). 
In 2016, the total number of apprentices in PHNSY nearly doubled and has 
remained much higher, while PNSY apprentice count has remained relatively stagnant. 
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However, the apprenticeship overall costs displayed in Figure 28 shows that both shipyards 
have experienced significant growth in costs to train the apprentices. What is peculiar is 
the costs per apprentice as illustrated in Figure 29 shows that there is a significant disparity 
in the costs per apprentice that has manifested after 2014.  
This disparity could indicate that either PNSY is not as efficient in training their 
apprentices, or that the true apprenticeship costs are being augmented or covered from 
different funding sources at the shipyards. Specifically, some of the apprenticeship costs at 
PHNSY could be paid for through project funds vice apprenticeship funds. If this was the 
case, this could explain the 80% increase in the difference of Direct Civilian Labor Costs 
per Man-Day at PHNSY and PNSY between FY2007-2014 and FY2016-2019 (Figure 22). 
Simply, the apprenticeship program at PHNSY could be not fully paying for the on-the-
job training that apprenticeships receive. This timeline also directly corresponds to the 
conversation Carreras’ had in 2014 regarding how apprentices are charged to projects. 
Because of the disparity between cost per apprentice at PHNSY and PNSY, it appears that 
this phenomenon could be happening at PHNSY, but not at PNSY.  
F. EXTRAPOLATION ON THE COST PER APPRENTICE DISPARITY 
To understand how the relationship between apprenticeship costs relates to labor 
cost per man-day, one must understand how pay is allocated to employees. In a simplistic 
example, ideally, an apprentice’s paycheck is drawn from an “Apprentice Fund” and a 
qualified laborer’s paycheck is drawn from either a “Shop Fund” when the laborer is not 
assigned to a project, or a “Project Fund” when the laborer is assigned to a project. The 
ratio of which fund the laborer’s paycheck is drawn from depends on the hours worked on 
a project.  
If an accounting system allows for an apprentice to receive their pay from a “Project 
Fund” account, then the expenditures from the “Apprentice Fund” would decrease, while 
the “Project Fund’s” expenditures would increase to maintain the predetermined and fixed 
apprentice pay. This increase in expenditures from the “Project Fund” could be classified 
as “Direct Labor” and therefore increase the direct labor cost per man-day for the shipyard. 
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As can be seen in Figure 22, the average difference in direct labor cost per man-day at 
PHNSY and PNSY has increased by 80% between FY2007–FY2014 and FY2016–2019.  
Because the expenditure from the Project Fund would presumptively require 
justification, some labor hours charged to a job are paid at an apprentice rate vice a 
qualified laborer’s rate, the change in expenditures for labor cost is likely immaterial per 
job. However, because the justification for labor hours for the apprentice is likely recorded 
as labor hours for a particular job along with the skilled laborer’s hours for the job, the total 
hours worked for the job has seemingly increased. Therefore, the next time that a project 
plans for that particular job, that job has grown in historical man-hours to complete.  
To determine the effect that apprentice costs and time could have on a project, 
additional information regarding the apprenticeship program is required. PHNSY states on 
their NAVSEA website that in four years apprentices work a minimum of 7200 hours split 
between On-The-Job-Training (OJT), trade theory, and academic study. Apprentices also 
earn approximately $20.03 per hour as a new apprentice. The following conservative 
assumptions are made to determine the effect of apprentice costs being absorbed by project 
funding. 
1. Half of the total apprentices are improperly paid with project funds 
2. One-Third of total apprentice hours are spent (OJT) 
3. One-half of OJT time is improperly paid for by the project funds 
With the above assumptions, at PHNSY, approximately 400 apprentices per year 
have some of their pay from project funds. Additionally, the approximate time spent OJT 
is 1200 hours in 4 years as an apprentice, therefore 300 hours in 1 year, which is 12.5 Man-
Days. That means potentially 5000 Man-Days per year are attributed to project time vice 
apprentice time. This 5000 Man-Days is approximately 2.4 million dollars in just wages to 
the apprentices. These numbers will be compared to total costs and total man-hours per 
project. 
Linear regression analysis was used to determine the average increase in project 
costs and man-days per year at PHNSY and PNSY. Additionally, the data was analyzed 
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prior to and after 2014 to show the change in project costs and man-days. Figures 30 and 
31 below present the same data as Figures 11 and 12, however Figures 30 and 31 include 
trendlines to show the change in growth after 2014. Table 2 is a summary of the slopes for 
each regression as well as a slope for a trendline between 2007 and 2018. 
 
Figure 30. Total Project Costs with Trendlines, split in 2014 
 


































































Table 2. Summary of Regression Slopes 
 
Total Cost CY19k$/FY 
(2007-2014) 
Total Cost CY19k$/FY 
(2014-2018) 
Total Cost CY19k$/FY 
(2007-2018) 
PHNSY-DSRA $      9,415.28 $    22,143.24 $      9,896.26 








PHNSY-DSRA 5526.71 25688.85 8814.07 
PNSY-EOH 6398.77 21430.79 8701.93 
 
As can be seen from the regressions, DSRAs performed at PHNSY before 2014 
could be expected to grow 9.415 million dollars per year, and 5526 man-days per year. 
After 2014, these growths were 22.143 million dollars per year, and 25688 man-days per 
year. The conservative estimation of the effect of project funds absorbing apprenticeship 
costs after 2014 was 19% (2403/(22143.24-9415.28)) of the change in costs per year, as 
well as 27% (5500/(25688.85-5526.71)) of the change in man-days per year. Furthermore, 
the apprenticeship burden could conservatively be 11% of the total change in costs per year 




This thesis is meant to serve as an analysis of trends in growth of Los Angeles class 
submarine maintenance periods. To begin, this analysis evaluated the extent that shipyards 
perform maintenance on Los Angeles class submarines. This led to the observation that 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard perform significantly more 
DSRA, PIRA, and EOH maintenance periods on Los Angeles class submarines. 
Furthermore, a PHNSY appears to primarily perform the majority of Los Angeles class 
DSRAs while PNSY appears to primarily perform the majority of Los Angeles class EOHs. 
The large history of DSRA and EOH maintenance at PHSNY and PNSY allows for trend 
analysis of those maintenance periods at those two specific shipyards, to attempt to identify 
underlying tendencies. 
After identifying PHNSY and PNSY as the two shipyards that perform the majority 
of specific maintenance availabilities on Los Angeles class submarines, a similar trend 
appeared for the growth at the two shipyards. Both DSRAs at PHNSY and EOHs at PNSY 
had grown on average roughly 8800 Man-Days every year since 2007. However, when 
trends in apprenticeship costs were compared, in 2014 PNSY had an unexpected and 
dramatic increase in the apprenticeship costs per apprentice when compared to PHNSY. A 
theory was proposed that the cost of an apprentice is lower at PHNSY because PHNSY is 
inappropriately paying for apprenticeship time with maintenance project funds. Although 
these funds can be significantly less than the total cost of the maintenance availability, the 
man-hours associated with wages to the apprentices could be inappropriately charged to 
specific jobs, which then leads to either longer time in the maintenance period, or an 
inability to accurately predict when the submarine will exit the shipyard and become 
operational. 
After the identification of the apprenticeship cost deviation in 2014, a trend analysis 
was performed on the cost and man-days associated with DSRAs and EOHs at PHNSY 
and PNSY before 2014 and after 2014. This found that there was a significant increase in 
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both cost and man-days of DSRAs and EOHs at their respective shipyards. While both 
PHNSY and PNSY increased their costs and man-days, PHNSY did so at a faster rate than 
PNSY. This shift in cost and man-days occurred at approximately the same time as 
Carreras’ interview with shipyard leadership in which discussions on how apprentice OJT 
would be charged. Although the Carreras’ interview is a single data point, the trending in 
apprentice costs at PHNSY indicate a possible connection. 
Although this theory of misappropriated apprenticeship costs is feasible, much 
more data is required before a conclusion could be reached. Additionally, the apparent 
correlation in apprenticeship costs and DSRA/EOH growth does not mean that there is 
definitely a causality between the two. However, what this analysis has hopefully brought 
to light is the real consequences that could arise from misappropriated work hours. A need 
has risen for accountable and objective tracking of job hours.  
B. RECOMMENDATION 
It is recommended that PHNSY, as well as all public shipyards, implement an 
electronic tracking mechanism for hours worked on each job. It is recommended that this 
tracking mechanism should have the capability of accurately tracking the total number of 
hours worked by both apprentices and those that have completed the apprenticeship 
program. This will contribute to accurate determinations of labor requirements to complete 
specific jobs, and a more accurate prediction of submarine maintenance duration. It is 
important to note that the purpose of this tracking is not for altering the wages of individual 
personnel, but rather for an accurate tracking mechanism to predict future work. The 
tracking mechanism should include a mechanism to ensure anonymity of the workers for 
the purpose of hour tracking. This thesis makes no claims to the adequacy or accountability 
for proper work control or quality assurance tracking mechanisms already in place. 
C. FURTHER STUDIES 
Further studies on this topic could include an analysis on current tracking of 
apprenticeship costs and job hours. These analyses should focus on the process for 
recording hours worked and how those recorded hours are utilized for both wage/benefits 
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as well as engineering data points. These analyses would be benefited from additional 
fidelity that the recommended modernization of job tracking could bring. 
Additionally, further studies could also include the following: 
1. Relative competition between shipyards, as it is possible that the shipyards 
have begun to monopolize different availability types. 
2. Labor growth rates compared to availability growth in complexity and 
time, as it is possible that the labor growth rates could be driving the 
length of shipyard maintenance.  
3. The effect of skilled labor work force retirements rates has on the duration 
of availabilities, as it is possible that the skilled labor work force is retiring 
faster than being replaced by new skilled workers. 
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APPENDIX A.  LABOR MAN-DAYS 
The table below shows direct labor man-days for all Los Angeles Class submarine maintenance performed at public 
shipyards started and completed between FY2005 and FY2019. This data is consolidated Department of the Navy Budget 
Estimates Justification Estimates provided by FMB. 
































NNSY 714 2009 DSRA 21,816 403 47,818 645 22,219 48,463 
NNSY 764 2009 DSRA 37,318 7,769 57,544 14,343 45,087 71,887 
NNSY 750 2010 DSRA 31,811 175 18,859 284 31,986 19,143 
NNSY 765 2010 DSRA 40,517 17,318 52,012 15,716 57,835 67,728 
NNSY 750 2012 EOH 233,711 20,322 322,559 20,202 254,033 342,761 
NNSY 753 2013 EOH 239,698 21902 555,429 34749 261,600 590,178 
PHNSY 688 2005 PIRA 75,864 - 104,602 - 75,864 104,602 
PHNSY 705 2006 DSRA 29,180 1,580 28,886 131 30,760 29,017 
PHNSY 752 2006 DSRA 29,180 6,579 44,180 2,944 35,759 47,124 
PHNSY 713 2007 DSRA 27,269 4,267 48,162 1,801 31,536 49,963 
PHNSY 701 2009 PIRA 34,335 3,346 116,079 232 37,681 116,311 
PHNSY 721 2009 EOH 245,186 19,072 257,374 16,139 264,258 273,513 
PHNSY 698 2010 DSRA 31,157 1,770 40,955 631 32,927 41,586 
PHNSY 722 2010 EOH 259,971 35,930 241,250 18,314 295,901 259,564 
PHNSY 699 2011 DSRA 41,233 609 72,837 53 41,842 72,890 
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PHNSY 705 2011 PIRA 95,116 66 123,706 7 95,182 123,713 
PHNSY 766 2011 DSRA 34,930 4,678 60,900 3,549 39,608 64,449 
PHNSY 713 2012 PIRA 50,015 112 62,720 26 50,127 62,746 
PHNSY 763 2012 DSRA 37,951 1,711 59,315 3,054 39,662 62,369 
PHNSY 771 2012 DSRA 27,983 1,055 62,751 2,667 29,038 65,418 
PHNSY 715 2013 PIRA 74,458 330 145,453 371 74,788 145,824 
PHNSY 724 2013 DSRA 50,604 1,272 98,402 1,476 51,876 99,878 
PHNSY 773 2013 DSRA 50,532 739 93,589 1,479 51,271 95,068 
PHNSY 758 2014 EOH 267,131 18278 368,465 33893 285,409 402,358 
PHNSY 770 2014 DSRA 50,613 2,609 58,296 3,546 53,222 61,842 
PHNSY 717 2015 DSRA 76,228 895 104,155 234 77,123 104,389 
PHNSY 759 2015 EOH 265,175 12495 397,285 9664 277,670 406,949 
PHNSY 721 2018 DSRA 176,591 2016 168,527 887 178,607 169,414 
PNSY 724 2007 EOH 255,227 40,155 260,753 39,784 295,382 300,537 
PNSY 723 2008 EOH 273,546 28,464 281,321 29,292 302,010 310,613 
PNSY 760 2008 DSRA 39,906 4,515 38,868 3,018 44,421 41,886 
PNSY 767 2009 DSRA 35,047 4,415 41,845 5,598 39,462 47,443 
PNSY 725 2010 EOH 216,019 22,677 269,832 24,761 238,696 294,593 
PNSY 751 2010 EOH 246,156 26,486 273,044 34,734 272,642 307,778 
PNSY 711 2011 PIRA 55,000 453 53,691 3,067 55,453 56,758 
PNSY 720 2012 PIRA 55,000 6,037 94,932 1,222 61,037 96,154 
PNSY 752 2012 EOH 223,802 23,927 314,550 25,000 247,729 339,550 
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PNSY 706 2013 PIRA 52,500 51 67,070 - 52,551 67,070 
PNSY 756 2014 EOH 231,855 17519 326,035 16402 249,374 342,437 
PNSY 760 2015 EOH 258,640 17569 321,656 30671 276,209 352,327 
PNSY 767 2015 EOH 273,252 2370 323,904 20149 275,622 344,053 
PNSY 719 2016 PIRA 135,815 97 204,443 468 135,912 204,911 
PNSY 723 2016 DSRA 63,455 738 - 67,413 64,193 67,413 
PNSY 761 2017 EOH 214,054 22942 371,636 30614 236,996 402,250 
PNSY 722 2018 DSRA - 98,160 - 121,622 98,160 121,622 
PNSY 751 2019 DSRA 67,757 19758 106,274 677 87,515 106,951 
PSNSY 725 2006 DSRA 19,640 1,067 35,359 130 20,707 35,489 
PSNSY 754 2006 DSRA 19,312 4,610 32,437 1,581 23,922 34,018 
PSNSY 759 2008 DSRA 31,797 6,059 37,143 2,596 37,856 39,739 
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APPENDIX B.  AVAILABILITY TOTAL COST 
The following data is the cost in CY2019$ of all availabilities completed between FY2007 and FY2019. The data is 
provided by VAMOSC but has been consolidated. Similar to the CBO 2019 report, there are multiple incidents where data 
provided by VAMOSC was inconsistent with other data available or a maintenance a submarine incurred costs at multiple 
shipyards for the same maintenance availability. In this situation, the total cost was allocated to the shipyard that performed the 
majority of the work. Additionally, some availabilities were not included due to extenuating circumstances. For example, neither 






















































AVAILABILITY 2008 $    41,056,312.87 713 PHNSY 













































AVAILABILITY 2010 $    56,072,147.61 765 NNSY 




AVAILABILITY 2010 $    58,064,960.74 762 PHNSY 
10/1/2009 6/2/2011 ENGINEERED OVERHAUL 2010 $ 238,579,273.56 725 PNSY 





















AVAILABILITY 2011 $    67,560,883.38 766 PHNSY 




AVAILABILITY 2011 $ 127,862,175.12 705 PHNSY 




















AVAILABILITY 2012 $ 118,284,937.94 720 PNSY 
11/1/2011 8/30/2013 ENGINEERED OVERHAUL 2012 $ 325,027,797.07 752 PNSY 





















AVAILABILITY 2013 $ 159,155,261.93 715 PHNSY 
















AVAILABILITY 2015 $    51,544,806.42 700 PNSY 
12/4/2013 8/7/2015 ENGINEERED OVERHAUL 2014 $ 264,824,787.62 757 PNSY 




AVAILABILITY 2015 $ 109,258,049.80 717 PHNSY 

















AVAILABILITY 2016 $ 190,657,124.01 719 PNSY 
6/12/2015 5/13/2017 ENGINEERED OVERHAUL 2015 $ 324,019,382.74 760 PNSY 
6/8/2016 5/1/2018 ENGINEERED OVERHAUL 2016 $ 325,821,471.76 767 PNSY 
1/6/2014 8/15/2018 ENGINEERED OVERHAUL 2014 $ 570,411,027.22 753 NNSY 












AVAILABILITY 2018 $ 180,673,566.40 721 PHNSY 




AVAILABILITY 2019 $ 113,357,925.77 751 PHNSY 
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APPENDIX C.  FINANCIAL DATA 
The following table is a compilation of select financial information of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard. This financial information was deemed directly related to submarine maintenance at the two predominantly 
submarine only public shipyards. This data is consolidated Department of the Navy Budget Estimates Justification Estimates 
provided by FMB. 
  





























































$769.62 $786.70 $869.24 $916.20 $804.66 $861.61 $922.50 $910.64 $980.19 $984.67 $1,060.
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145,332
.00  
     
313,190
.00  
     
280,370
.00  
     
360,127
.00  
     
427,829
.00  
     
376,587
.00  
     
401,205
.00  
     
383,251
.00  
     
371,118
.00  
     
426,563
.00  
     
505,240
.00  
PNSY      
166,672
.00  
     
437,251
.00  
     
424,344
.00  
     
437,462
.00  
     
442,044
.00  
     
469,070
.00  
     
399,999
.00  
     
497,629
.00  
     
596,548
.00  
     
535,456
.00  









4030 4279 4396 4405 4525 4334 4457 5050 5250 5549 5832 
PNSY 3901 4189 4466 4539 4672 4614 4749 5508 5587 6023 6262 
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APPENDIX D.  APPRENTICESHIP DATA 
The table below shows selected apprentice and apprenticeship costs associated with all four public shipyards that perform 












516 509 491 482 487 454 500 806 1050 927 785 
PNSY 646 482 616 522 506 468 454 424 426 434 416 
NNSY 536 425 399 712 741 813 847 916 988 1050 1185 
PSNS
Y 






$8,297 $7,420 $7,038 $6,652 $7,292 $7,195 $7,101 $12,406 $13,040 $15,225 $16,747 
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